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Narrowing the Scope of Judicial Review for 
Humanitarian Appeals of Deportation Orders 
in Canada, New Zealand and the United 
States 
Dr. Timothy Philip Fadgen1, Dr. Guy Charlton2 and Dr. Mark 
Kielsgard3 
ABSTRACT 
The paper will compare the humanitarian and 
compassionate appeal provisions in relevant immigration law 
allowed to deportees in Canada, New Zealand and the United 
States. It argues that while recent changes in each of the countries 
have preserved the humanitarian appeals process, the basis of the 
appeal and judicial review have been dramatically narrowed by 
changes in legislation and case law. These changes have 
particularly limited the scope of judicial review and the ability of 
the courts to overturn administrative decisions regarding the fitness 
of an applicant to benefit from the appeal provisions. 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
Immigration policy is inextricably linked to a nation’s 
sovereignty as defining the desirable members of the community 
within the territory is part of defining the nation itself.4 From this 
                                                
1 Dr. Fadgen is a Fulbright-Clinton Fellow attached to the Attorney General of 
Samoa and visiting research fellow at the University of Auckland. 
2 Dr. Charlton is an Associate Professor of Law at City University of Hong 
Kong. 
3 Dr. Kielsgard is an Assistant Professor of Law at City University of Hong 
Kong. 
4 CATHERINE DAUVERGNE, MAKING PEOPLE ILLEGAL: WHAT GLOBALIZATION 
MEANS FOR MIGRATION AND LAW (Cambridge University Press, 2008) (For a 
discussion of the impact globalisation has had on immigration and nationality 
242 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY Vol. 35.2 
perspective, immigration policy is invariably bound up in notions of 
state and national identity within the context of the international 
system. As such, immigration scholar Cheryl Shanks argues that 
changes in the international context are critical to understanding 
immigration policy since these changes to migrant flows help to 
crystallise a definition of “self” in the host country.5 Shanks argues 
that identity and behaviour are critical elements as justifications for 
regional or national quotas or as a basis for prohibiting migrants 
bearing certain undesirable behavioural attributes. At the same time, 
the rights and judicial protections accorded immigrants are often 
different from those accorded citizens or other minorities. 
Immigrants, deportees and “excluded” individuals are generally not 
considered protected minorities who would be entitled to 
appropriate equal protections and due process under domestic law. 
Immigration policy and law, as bound up in sovereignty 
prerogatives and foreign policy more generally, is left by the courts 
to the political branches. 
These notions are particularly evident in deportation or 
removal situations. Deirdre Moloney defines deportation or removal 
as a “state-mandated process by which non-citizen immigrants are 
expelled from a nation and returned to their countries of origin after 
residing in the state, on the basis of an administrative determination 
that they have violated immigration policy or committed a crime.”6 
Exclusion, on the other hand, is where someone seeking entry or 
arriving in a state is turned away for a myriad of reasons, such as 
possessing an invalid visa or having been convicted of certain 
crimes in their country of origin.7 In addition to those forcibly 
                                                
policy see Stephen Legomsky, The Last Bastions of State Sovereignty: 
Immigration and Nationality go Global, in CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION: 
IMMIGRATION, SOCIAL WELFARE, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 43 (Andrew Sobel ed., 
2009)). 
5 CHERYL SHANKS, IMMIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN 
SOVEREIGNTY, 1890-1990, pp. 10-30 (2001). 
6 DEIRDRE MOLONEY, NATIONAL INSURITIES: IMMIGRANTS AND U.S. 
DEPORTATION POLICY SINCE 1882, at 8 (2012). 
7 In 2013 the total number of individuals either removed or excluded from entry 
to the U.S. numbered 358,000 Anthony Advincula, “US deported around 369,000 
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removed, there are those who ‘voluntarily return’ to their country of 
origin. This is typically done in response to apprehension and threat 
of deportation or removal. Moloney further describes the removal 
process as an “administrative, not criminal process and thus offers 
insufficient enumerated protections for those facing hearings and 
possible expulsion.”8 
The criteria by which individuals are excluded by 
deportation or exclusion for the state however, often times does not 
preclude additional or equitable considerations where domestic 
immigration law would warrant removal. Various international 
legal instruments, constitutional texts and common law rights, plus 
the “all-or-nothing” aspect of legal rules have preserved an area of 
discretion for decisions-makers based on equitable and 
humanitarian considerations. While such appeals are not afforded to 
all individuals,9 these appeals, initially decided by the executive or 
administrative appellate tribunals, are subject to only limited 
judicial review. Moreover, in line with security-oriented and 
identity-based national and international contexts,10 the scope of 
these humanitarian appeals, both at the administrative and court 
level, have decreased over the past several decades. In New 
Zealand, the removal of the five-prong humanitarian test found in 
sections 22 and 105 of the Immigration Act 1987 reduces the scope 
of judicial review on immigration decisions as well as lessens the 
impact of international law with the concomitant greater scope for 
executive discretion.11 Given this wide new discretion and the low 
                                                
immigrants in 2013” GLOBAL NATION.NET (Jan. 5, 2014) 
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/95751/us-deported-around-369000-immigrants-
in-2013. 
 8 MOLONEY, supra note 6, at 3. 
9 See, e.g., individuals who have engaged in acts of terrorism or violating human 
or international rights may not appeal an order under humanitarian considerations 
in Canada. Section 64, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001, S.C., c. 64 
(Can.) (hereinafter IRPA). 
10 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt & Peter J. Katzenstein, Norms, 
Identity and Culture in National Security, in THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL 
SECURITY 33 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1996). 
11 Immigration Act 1987, s. 22, 105 (N.Z.). 
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Wednesbury standard of review12 employed by the courts in 
immigration appeals, New Zealand’s internal human rights 
commitments and international obligations are significantly 
impacted, as is evident in the recent High Court opinion Babulal v. 
Department of Labour.13 In Canada, the 2001 Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act excludes various classes of individuals for 
humanitarian appeals and the Supreme Court of Canada recently 
held that the courts should provide a measure of deference where a 
particular decision has been allocated by Parliament to an 
administrative decision-maker rather than to the courts.14 In the 
United States (“U.S.”) efforts to restrict judicial intervention and 
review have had a long history; most recently in 2005 when 
Congress restricted habeas corpus review of immigration appeals to 
the court of appeals.15 
In Part II, III, and IV of this article we provide a brief 
overview and discussion of each states immigration policies and 
relevant laws. In Part V of this article we provide an in depth 
comparative analysis to these three states immigration policies. 
Finally in Part VI, we argue that as the scope and content of these 
humanitarian appeals have narrowed Canada, New Zealand and the 
U.S. may be unduly infringing upon rights guaranteed by 
international instruments and domestic constitutional documents. 
                                                
12 Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., [1947] 
EWCA Civ 1 (holding, inter alia, that courts will defer to administrative decision-
making unless the decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker 
would arrive at that result). 
13 Yatish Suresh Babulal v. Chief Executive, Department of Labour, CIV-2011-
404-1773. 
14 Canada (Citzenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 (Can.). 
15 Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial 
Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 1411 (1997); REAL ID 
Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13. 
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II. CANADA 
A Brief Overview of Canadian Immigration Policy 
Canada has increasingly welcomed immigrants over the past 
several decades. It accepts more immigrants per capita and the 
highest proportion of foreign-born residents (20.6%) than any other 
G8 states.16 It also has a long-standing official policy of supporting 
multiculturalism having officially embraced “multiculturalism 
within a bilingual framework” in 1971. This policy, while asserting 
that Canada had two official languages, observes that there is no 
official culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over 
another, and helps minority groups to preserve their language and 
culture.17 Indeed “Canadianess” is increasingly being defined as 
incorporating “multiculturalism” within a tolerant and inclusive 
society.18 
Such was not always the case. While official government 
narratives argue that two major constitutional documents, the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763 and the Quebec Act set the basis for a 
multicultural social framework that is solicitous to peoples of 
different cultures, Canadian immigration policy has historically 
been premised on the recruitment of “desirable” white northern 
European immigrants and the exclusion of non-white non-European 
“undesirable” immigrants.19 Initial immigration laws favoured 
British and northern European individuals. This was consistent with 
the nascent formation of Canadian identity as “British North 
                                                
16 Statistics Canada: “Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity in Canada, 
National Household Survey, 2011” Online: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/ 
multiculturalism/citizenship.asp (G8 states include France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the United Kingdom, the U.S., Canada and Russia). 
17 See generally, Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada (1985) Education: 
Cultural Pluralism in Canada, Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, at 15. 
18 AUGIES FLERAS, THE POLITICS OF MULTICULTURALISM: MULTICULTURAL 
GOVERNANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 56-58 (2009). 
19 GERALD BEAUDOIN & DOROTHY DOBBIE, A RENEWED CANADA: THE REPORT 
OF THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 
28 (1992). 
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American” and overt Anglo-centrism contraposed against the 
melting pot of the U.S. immigration policy was overlaid by a strict 
hierarchy of preferred racial groups which sought to exclude 
Blacks, Asians and other “races” due to cultural and racial 
differences and because they were considered “unsuited” to the cold 
Canadian climate. However, unable to compete with the U.S. and in 
need of labour (particularly agricultural labour) to develop, Canada 
expanded recruitment efforts to include immigrants from Eastern 
Europe while tolerating immigration from Asia and other “non-
white” areas. Nevertheless, the underlying justification of 
“climatic” unsuitability continued to provide conceptual cover for 
ideas of British/French racial and cultural superiority and reinforced 
notions that these peoples were non-assimilable.20 These attitudes 
were reflected in the law; for example, section 38 of the 1910 
                                                
20 This attitude is evident in statements regarding Canada’s immigration policy 
in the 1920s, see, e.g., Canada’s Immigration Policy, in CANADA YEAR BOOK 
165-66 (1930) ("Immigration, which was at a low ebb during the war period, is 
again increasing and becoming a chief means of reinforcing our population and 
filling up the vast waste spaces of Canada. But where any considerable 
immigration into a democratic country occurs, the racial and linguistic 
composition of that immigration becomes of paramount importance. Canadians 
generally prefer that settlers should be of a readily assimilable type, already 
identified by race or language with one or the other of the two great races now 
inhabiting this country and thus prepared for the assumption of the duties of 
democratic Canadian citizenship. Since the French are not to any great extent an 
emigrating people, this means in practice that the great bulk of the preferable 
settlers are those who speak the English language - those coming from the U.K. 
or the U.S. Next in order of readiness of assimilation are the Scandinavians and 
the Dutch, who readily learn English and are already acquainted with the 
workings of free democratic institutions. Settlers from Southern and Eastern 
Europe, however desirable from a purely economic point of view, are less readily 
assimilated, and the Canadianizing of the people from these regions who have 
come to Canada in the present century is a problem both in the agricultural 
Prairies Provinces and in the cities of the East. Less assimilable still, according to 
the general opinion of Canadians, are those who come to Canada from the Orient. 
On the whole the great bulk of Canadian immigration of the past generation has 
been drawn from the English-speaking countries and from those Continental 
European countries where the population is ethnically nearly related to the 
British, though in recent years there has been an increasing immigra-tion of 
Slavs.”). 
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Canadian Immigration Act granted the Federal cabinet the power to 
prohibit the entry “of immigrants belonging to any race deemed 
unsuited to the climate or requirements of Canada.”21 As such, 
certain immigrants were required to pay exorbitant head taxes, 
denied the franchise, or denied the opportunity to work in certain 
industries or with white women.22 At the same time various groups, 
such as the Chinese, were almost completely banned from 
immigrating to Canada.23 
Having increased difficulty justifying blatantly racial-based 
exclusion policies, which might affect Canada’s international 
reputation, immigration policy changed after the Second World 
War. The federal government dramatically overhauled the 
immigration system while simultaneously providing for Canadian 
Citizenship in 1946. The 1952 Immigration Act,24 premised on the 
idea immigration should meet the economic development needs and 
family reunification objectives as well as provide for refugees, 
nevertheless continued to exclude Asians who had no close 
relatives already living in Canada, homosexuals, prostitutes, and 
mentally disordered individuals.25 It also allowed for quotas on 
South Asians.26 Nevertheless, the racialist and Anglo-centric 
aspects of Canadian immigration policy were discarded by 1962. 
After 1962 Canada implemented a points system, which 
sought to address work and skills shortages and gave preferences to 
certain classes of immigrants. The Immigration Act, 1976 
                                                
21 An Act respecting Immigration, EARLY CANADIANA ONLINE (1910), available 
at http://eco.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.9_07184#oocihm.9_07184/ 
15?r=0&s=1&_suid=1386665734839040821823483198094. 
22 JAMES W.ST.G.WALKER, “RACE” RIGHTS AND THE LAW IN THE SUPREME 
COURT OF CANADA: HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES, ch. 2(1997). 
23 Lily Cho, Redress Revisited: Citizenship and the Chinese Canadian Head 
Tax, in CANADA: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE CULTURE OF REDRESS 87-89 
(Jennifer Henderson & Pauline Wakeham eds., 2013). 
24 Canadian History; Immigration Voices at http://www.canadianhistory.ca/ 
iv/1945-1967/act/ 
25 Immigration Act 1952, s. 5 at Immigration Voices at http://www. 
canadianhistory.ca/iv/1945-1967/textwindow/immigration_act_1952.html. 
26 Canada in the Making, http://www.canadiana.ca/citm/specifique/ 
immigration_e.html. 
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established three categories for potential immigrants: family class, 
independent class, and humanitarian class.27 Family class 
immigrants were given priority and were provided points for having 
family members in Canada or were exempt from certain point 
requirements.28 The generally more prosperous, entrepreneurial and 
skilled independent immigrant class was awarded points based on 
certain characteristics, which were indicative of certain economic 
needs.29 The humanitarian class was those individuals whose 
settlement was considered to be part of Canada’s humanitarian 
obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees.30 At the same time, the cabinet was given considerable 
latitude in easing entrance requirements for refugees, including the 
creation of “displaced and persecuted” peoples’ categories that 
would not be required to meet normal entrance requirements for 
refugees. The Immigration Act, 1976 also gave more power to the 
provinces to set their own immigration laws and expanded the list 
of prohibited classes of individuals to include those who might be a 
burden of social welfare or health services.31 Later changes in the 
1980s and 1990s established a category for “business” immigrants 
who could invest significant funds in the economy.32 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001 
Twenty-first century developments included the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001 (IRPA), which 
currently sets forth the grounds and appeals protection from 
                                                
27 Immigration Act 1975, ss. 7 & 114. 
28 Alan Simmons, Immigration and Canada: Global and Transnational 
Perspectives Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press Inc., 201) at 71-81. 
29 Canadian history: Immigration Voices at  http://www.canadianhistory.ca/ 
iv/1967-Present/overview2.html 
30 Canada: Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Penny Becklumb, 
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deportation orders, exclusion orders and departure orders.33 The Act 
provides for the consideration of humanitarian and compassionate 
factors in light of all the circumstances of the case on appeal to the 
Minister under section 25, with a right of judicial review in Federal 
Court. The Minister is obligated to consider applications made by 
foreign nationals who are located within Canada but is not obligated 
to consider applications made by a foreign national located outside 
of Canada. An appeal under section 25 may be based on 
humanitarian considerations which take “into account the best 
interests of a child directly affected” or where “sufficient 
humanitarian and compassionate considerations warrant special 
relief [from the removal order] in light of all the circumstances of 
the case.”34 
The procedure for a humanitarian and compassionate review 
is divided into two assessment stages. The first assessment stage is 
a request from an applicant for an exemption from certain 
requirements under IRPA or any applicable regulations.35 The 
burden of proof is upon the applicant to show that their individual 
circumstances warrant an exemption.36 The second assessment 
stage, which only occurs after a positive first assessment stage, is a 
determination of whether the applicant will be provided permanent 
residency.37 After an initial determination by an immigration 
officer, an applicant may appeal a negative determination to the 
Immigration Review Division under sections 63 and 65 of IPRA if 
the “foreign national is a member of the family class and that their 
sponsor is a sponsor within the meaning of the regulations.”38 Other 
individuals who are not in the family class or a sponsor may appeal 
                                                
33 Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227,c. 223 
(Can.). 
34 IRPA,c. 67(c) 
35 IPRA, c. 25. 
36 The applicant who “bears the burden of proving any claim upon which he 
relies” Owusu v. MCI, 2004 FCA 38 at para. 5. 
37 Canada: Citizenship and Immigration Canada: IP5 “Immigrant Applications in 
Canada made on Humanitarian or Compassionate Grounds” Online: http://www 
.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/ip/ip05-eng.pdf 
38 IPRA c. 65. 
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directly to the Federal Court under section 72.39 However, section 
64 of the Act prohibits appeals from certain categories of 
individuals: Those who have committed serious crimes (defined as 
a term of imprisonment of at least six months or punishable by a 
maximum term of at least ten years imprisonment), individuals who 
have engaged in organized criminality, violated human or 
international rights or may be a threat to national security and those 
individuals who have engaged in misrepresentation (unless the 
sponsored family member is the sponsor’s spouse, common-law 
partner or child).40 
The judicial appeals process concerns the adequacy of the 
decisions applying the humanitarian and compassionate factors or 
evaluating the Minister’s determination that certain classes of 
applicants are excluded from a humanitarian and compassionate 
appeal. For a determination of whether a ministerial determination 
is valid, the standard of review for an appeal is reasonableness.41 A 
correct decision under this standard is where there is “the existence 
of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-
making process” and “whether the decision falls within a range of 
possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the 
facts and law.”42 The criteria for determining a humanitarian and 
compassionate appeal was outlined by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration).43 They include: 
(1) The seriousness of the offense leading to the 
removal order; 
(2) The potential of rehabilitation; 
                                                
39 IRPA, c. 72.(1) (stating, “Judicial review by the Federal Court with respect to 
any matter — a decision, determination or order made, a measure taken or a 
question raised — under this Act is commenced by making an application for 
leave to the Court.”). 
40 IPRA, c. 34, 35, 36 & 37. 
41 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, para. 45 (Can.). 
42 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, para. 47 (Can.). 
43 Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 
84 (Can.). 
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(3) The length of time spent and the degree to which 
the individual has resided in Canada; 
(4) Family and community support available to the 
person facing removal; 
(5) The impact the removal would have on the 
family in Canada (if any) and the dislocation to the 
family that a removal would cause; and 
(6) The degree of hardship that would be caused to 
the removed individual in his country of 
nationality.44 
Other factors include health considerations and lack of 
critically necessary healthcare and discrimination45 in the 
applicant’s home country not covered by section 96 or section 97 of 
IPRA.46 The Federal Court also noted that applicants must show 
“unusual, underserved or disproportionate hardship” which must 
personally affect the applicant in order to sustain a favourable 
ruling under section 25. 
In Berthoumieux v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration)47 Roy, J. noted that allegations of “risks made in an 
application for permanent residence on humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds (H&C) must relate to a particular risk that is 
                                                
44 Id. at paras. 40-41, 90. 
45 Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.R. 
497, para. 26 (Can.) (citing Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 
1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.) (describing discrimination as “a distinction which intentional 
or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual 
or group, has the effect of impos[ing] disadvantages not imposed upon others or 
which withholds or limits access to advantages available to other members of 
society. Distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an individual 
solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely escape the charge of 
discrimination, while those based on an individual's merits and capacities will 
rarely be so classed.”). 
46 IP 5: Immigrant Applications in Canada Made on Humanitarian or 
Compassionate Grounds, CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, http://www. 
cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/ip/ip05-eng.pdf. 
47 Berthoumieux v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2013] 
F.C. No. 1301 (Can.). 
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personal to the applicant” [emphasis in original].48 As such, 
generally poor conditions in the applicant’s home state, which 
affect all individuals in the country do not in and of themselves 
constitute hardship. An appeal is allowed if the decision being 
appealed was wrong in law or fact, if there was a breach of a 
principle of natural justice (for example, a breach to the right to be 
heard), or if the court determines that the applicant has met the 
burden of proof regarding the humanitarian and compassionate 
considerations. 
Individuals who are denied the opportunity to apply on 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds because they fall within 
an excluded category may also seek judicial review. IPRA prevents 
those individuals who have engaged in organised criminality, 
(section 37), the violation of human or international rights (section 
35), and an act endangering national security (section 34), as 
determined by the Minister, from using the humanitarian and 
compassionate review process.49 The determination of who fits 
within a particular category as well as the opportunity of the 
exercise for ministerial discretion under these heads is also 
reviewable by the courts. However, the burden upon those excluded 
by ministerial decision is high and the exemption provisions cannot 
include factors which might be considered humanitarian factors 
under section 25. 
This is evident in Agraira v. Canada, where the Supreme 
Court gave wide discretion to the Minister in determining whether 
an individual is a threat to national security and affirmed that 
humanitarian and compassionate factors could not be used under 
section 34(2) to obtain an exemption from exclusion based on 
national security grounds.50 Agraira, a citizen of Libya was found to 
be inadmissible on security grounds due to his membership in the 
Libyan National Salvation Front, which had been classified as a 
terrorist organization by Citizenship and Immigration Canada.51 
                                                
48 Berthoumieux v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2013] 
F.C. No. 1301 at para. 12. (Can.). 
49 IPRA c. 34, 35, & 37. 
50 Agraira v. Canada, [2013] S.C.R.36 (Can.). 
51 Id. at para. 9. 
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Agraira argued that the ministerial discretion of rejecting his 
application for an exemption under 34(2) as a national security risk 
emphasized public safety and national security factors to the 
exclusion of other relevant factors under section 34.52 
The Court observing that the standard of review was 
reasonableness and that considerable deference was to be accorded 
the minister, noted that “a court reviewing the reasonableness of a 
minister’s exercise of discretion is not entitled to engage in a new 
weighing process.”53 As such, while the Court agreed that the term 
“national interest” was broader than simply public security and 
national defence, it declined to reverse the Ministerial decision as to 
the finding of a security risk under section 34(1) and a 
determination of an exemption under section 34(2).54 Moreover, the 
Court noted that individual factors that may be relevant to a finding 
that the individuals continued presence in Canada “is not 
detrimental to the national interest,” cannot include humanitarian 
and compassionate factors used under section 25.55 Thus for these 
                                                
52 Section 34 of IRPA states: 
34. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security 
grounds for 
(a) engaging in an act of espionage or an act of subversion against a democratic 
government, institution or process as they are understood in Canada; 
(b) engaging in or instigating the subversion by force of any government; 
(c) engaging in terrorism; 
(d) being a danger to the security of Canada; 
(e) engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety 
of persons in Canada; or 
(f) being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
engages, has engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or 
(c). 
(2) The matters referred to in subsection (1) do not constitute inadmissibility in 
respect of a permanent resident or a foreign national who satisfies the Minister 
that their presence in Canada would not be detrimental to the national interest. 
IRPA, S.C. 2001, c.27. (Can.). 
38 Id. at para. 91. 
 
54 Id. at para. 65. 
55 Id. at para. 84 (quoting “[B]ecause of the possibility of H&C relief under s. 25 
of the IRPA, the principle of consistent expression dictates that H&C factors 
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excluded individuals, personal or familial humanitarian or 
compassionate considerations, which may be relevant to ascertain 
how or why they may have acquired a proscribed membership, 
engaged in or committed various acts or which could be relevant for 
determination of their status, can never be considered. In effect, 
proper status and identity are a condition precedent for the privilege 
of the humanitarian and compassionate appeals. 
The implication is that public safety and national security 
are privileged considerations under IPRA and that Ministerial 
discretion is accorded wider latitude in removal determinations 
where humanitarian and compassionate factors may be relevant is 
increasingly evident in Canadian removal and exclusion process. 
IPRA has been amended over the years to expand ministerial 
discretion and limit the scope of humanitarian appeals while 
refocusing the immigration law more towards issues of security. 
This was recognized by the Court in Medovarski v. Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration). 
The objectives as expressed in the IRPA indicate an 
intent to prioritize security. . . . Viewed collectively, 
the objectives of the IRPA and its provisions 
concerning permanent residents, communicate a 
strong desire to treat criminals and security threats 
less leniently than under the former Act.56 
The 2010 Balanced Refugee Reform Act amended IRPA to 
restrict the right to appeal under section 25 and allowed the 
Minister to place further restrictions on foreign nationals who have 
been granted permanent residency on humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds for public policy considerations.57 The Act 
also added a new section [25(1.3)],58 which specifies that the 
Minister may not consider factors taken into account during the 
                                                
should not be relevant to a determination of what is in the national interest under 
s. 34(2).”). 
56 Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2 
S.C.R. 539, para. 10 (Can.). 
57 Balanced Refugee Reform Act S.C. 2010, c. 8. 
58 IPRA, c. 25(1.3). 
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refugee determination process when examining an application on 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds made by a foreign 
national, but requires the Minister to consider factors related to the 
hardships that affect the foreign national applicant. As such, in any 
application received after June 29, 2010 factors such as well-
founded fear of persecution, risk to life, and risk of cruel and 
unusual treatment or punishment are not considered as part of the 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds process. Rather, these 
factors will be considered separately during the refugee protection 
determination process. The effect of such changes is that the 
applicant has a restricted factual basis upon which to make a section 
25 application. 
In 2012, the Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act 
amended IRPA to eliminate access to the Immigration Appeal 
Division (IAD) for those permanent residents or family class 
members who receive certain criminal sentences within Canada or 
who are thought to have committed offences outside of Canada.59 
The Act also expands Ministerial discretion to deny entry to 
individuals on unspecified “public policy grounds”, increases the 
penalty for misrepresentation from two to five years, entitles 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service to conduct unrestricted, 
compelled examinations of anyone making any application under 
the Act, reduces already limited remedies for persons subject to 
other findings of inadmissibility, and limits inadmissibility for 
temporary entrants with inadmissible family members.60 
The increased security emphasis, facilitated by the increased 
deference the courts have taken toward ministerial decisions builds 
on earlier jurisprudence, which limited the application of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter), particularly section 7 as 
an infringement upon a security or liberty interest in removal 
cases.61 Following Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick,62 the Canadian 
                                                
59 Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, S.C. 2012, c. 17. 
60 S.C. 2012, c. 17 
61 Government of Canada, Constitution Act, 1982, JUSTICE LAWS WEBSITE, 
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/page-15.html (“S. 7. Everyone has the 
right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived 
thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”) 
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courts have applied a reasonableness standard of review for 
Immigration Appeals Division decisions and have been deferential 
to administrative decisions made by the Minister. This deference 
has been justified by changes in the legislation, practical 
considerations and separation of power considerations.63 Removal 
decisions require “the application of broad policy considerations to 
the facts as found to be relevant, and weigh for importance” and 
whether there are sufficient humanitarian and compassionate 
considerations to warrant relief from a removal order is “a decision 
Parliament confided to the AID, not to the courts.”64 Moreover, as 
pointed out by the Court in Minister of Citizenship and Immigration 
v. Khosa, it extends “not only to facts and policy but to a tribunal’s 
interpretation of its constitutive statute and related enactments, 
because “there might be multiple valid interpretations of a statutory 
provision or answers to a legal dispute and that courts ought not to 
interfere where the tribunal’s decision is rationally supported.”65 
The deference and policy consideration have extended to 
constitutional analysis under section 7 of the Charter. This 
jurisprudence has effectively limited the scope of section 7 to issues 
of procedural substantive justice without any inquiry into the issue 
of whether removal in and of itself violates a protected liberty 
interest.66 The Court in Medovarski v. Canada per McLachlin, C.J. 
                                                
(Unsucessful charter challenges have been made under s. 11(h) (right not to be 
tried and punished for same offense twice), s. 12 (right not to be subjected to 
cruel and unusual punishment), s. 15 (equal protection and benefit of the law) as 
well as s. 7). See Daniela Bassan, The Canadian Charter and Public 
International Law: Redefining the State’s Power to Deport Aliens, 34 Osgoode 
Hall L. J. 3, 583, 595-600 (1996). 
62 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190. (Court to 
apply reasonableness standard  “[w]here the question is one of fact, discretion or 
policy, deference will usually apply automatically”) Dunsmuir at para. 53. 
63 Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Khosa, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339,para. 
4 (Can.). 
64 Id. at para. 4. 
65 Id. at para. 25. 
66 Chiarelli v. Canada, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, para. 27 (Can.) (Thus Parliament has 
the right to adopt an immigration policy and to enact legislation prescribing the 
conditions under which non-citizens will be permitted to enter and remain in 
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observed that “[t]he most fundamental principle of immigration law 
is that non-citizens do not have an unqualified right to enter or 
remain in Canada.”67 The Court added: “Thus the deportation of a 
non-citizen in itself cannot implicate the liberty and security 
interests protected by s. 7.”68 As such, while the Court has found 
that certification of security threats have offended procedural 
fundamental justice under section 7,69 the Charter protections in 
these cases are essentially procedural, and the underlying policy 
impetus, reflected in the common law remains important. For 
example, in Chiarelli v. Canada the court noted that in order to 
determine “the scope of principles of fundamental justice” in 
deportation cases as they might apply to the particular facts, “the 
                                                
Canada. It has done so in the Immigration Act….The qualified nature of the 
rights of non-citizens to enter and remain in Canada is made clear by s. 4 of the 
Act… One of the conditions Parliament has imposed on a permanent resident's 
right to remain in Canada is that he or she not be convicted of an offence for 
which a term of imprisonment of five years or more may be imposed. This 
condition represents a legitimate, non-arbitrary choice by Parliament of a 
situation in which it is not in the public interest to allow a non-citizen to remain 
in the country. The requirement that the offence be subject to a term of 
imprisonment of five years indicates Parliament's intention to limit this condition 
to more serious types of offences. It is true that the personal circumstances of 
individuals who breach this condition may vary widely…. However there is one 
element common to all persons who fall within the class of permanent residents 
described in s. 27(1)(d)(ii). They have all deliberately violated an essential 
condition under which they were permitted to remain in Canada. In such a 
situation, there is no breach of fundamental justice in giving practical effect to the 
termination of their right to remain in Canada. In the case of a permanent 
resident, deportation is the only way in which to accomplish this. There is 
nothing inherently unjust about a mandatory order. The fact of a deliberate 
violation of the condition imposed by s. 27(1)(d)(ii) is sufficient to justify a 
deportation order. It is not necessary, in order to comply with fundamental 
justice, to look beyond this fact to other aggravating or mitigating circumstances). 
67 Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2 
S.C.R. 539, paras. 10, 46 (Can.) para. 46. 
68 Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2 
S.C.R. 539, paras.10, 46 (Can.) (emphasis added). 
69 Charkaoui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 
S.C.R. 350 (Can.). 
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court must look to the principles and policies underlying 
immigration law.”70 
III. NEW ZEALAND 
A Brief Overview of New Zealand’s Immigration 
Policy71 
The Economist has recently ranked New Zealand as the fifth 
most democratic State in its annual democracy index.72 Human 
rights and civil liberties are supported by statutory and common law 
protections such as the Human Rights Act 1993, judicial review of 
executive action, natural justice and international human rights 
conventions. New Zealand’s Human Rights Act 1993 is designed to 
protect fundamental human rights “in general accordance with 
United Nations Covenants or Conventions on Human Rights” and 
has been accorded “special status” by the courts.73 The courts have 
recognized that such human rights guarantees shall guide the 
determinations of New Zealand’s many statutory tribunals, 
including the Immigration and Protection Tribunal (IPT) and 
potentially any decision of a public nature.74 New Zealand courts 
have also held that international treaty obligations and principles of 
customary public international law impose extra-legal restraints.75 
                                                
70 Chiarelli v. Canada (Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, 
para. 734 (Can.). 
71 See Fadgen and Charlton, 2012(43) VUWLR. 
72 Democracy index 2012 Democracy at a Standstill: A Report from The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, THE ECONOMIST (2013), available at 
https://portoncv.gov.cv/dhub/porton.por_global.open_file?p_doc_id=1034. 
73 Dir. of Human Rights Proceedings v N.Z. Thoroughbred Racing Inc. [2002] 3 
NZLR 333 (CA) 339 Elias CJ for the Court. 
74 Royal Australasian Coll. of Surgeons v Phipps [1999] 3 NZLR 1 (CA); 
O'Leary v Health Funding Auth. [2001] NZAR 717 (HC). 
75 See e.g. Puli'uvea v Removal Review Auth. (1996) 14 FRNZ 322 (CA) 331 
(finding courts will courts will "strive to interpret legislation consistently with the 
treaty obligations of New Zealand."); N.Z. Airline Pilots Ass’n Inc. v Attorney-
General [1997] 3 NZLR 269 (CA) 289 (finding such obligations are viewed 
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These general human rights principles have not, however, 
always enjoyed such an expansive application within the 
immigration context. The common law has recognised this broad 
power. As noted by Cooke J, “[i]mmigration is a subject linked 
with foreign policy [and] . . . [i]n that sense it falls within a sphere 
where the Courts are very slow to intervene.”76 International norms 
and institutions have also had an effect, but domestic politics and 
liberal democratic norms as articulated within the domestic polity 
have had the paramount impact on national migration control policy 
and law.77 As such, the decisional efficacy of humanitarian 
considerations on administrative and judicial decision-making, 
while informed by international law, generally remains wedded to 
domestic conceptions of what is “humanitarian.” 
New Zealand, settled by a predominately British population, 
developed a migration policy dominated by economic, and to a 
lesser extent racial and social, considerations. After World War II 
the Government accepted the recommendation of the Dominion 
Population Commission that immigration (including government 
sponsored immigration from the United Kingdom and Northern 
Europe) could be used to fill jobs in secondary and tertiary 
industries that could not be staffed by the current workforce.78 In 
1960 additional changes were made to staff essential industries. The 
economic arguments in favour of increased immigration often 
clashed with the widely subscribed notion that New Zealand wished 
to remain “British” and “non-Asian”.79 From 1920 onward this 
policy provided that all individuals who were not “of British birth 
                                                
"whether or not the legislation was enacted with the purpose of implementing the 
relevant text."). 
76 Ashby v Minister of Immigration [1981] 1 NZLR 222 (CA) 226 Cooke J for 
the Court. 
77 Virginie Guiraudon & Gallya Lahav, A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty 
Debate: The Case of Migration Control, 33 Comp. Pol. Stud. 163, 164 (2000). 
78 Dominion Population Committee: Report of the Dominion Population 
Committee, AUSTL. J. OF HUMAN RIGHTS17, 21–22 (1946). 
79 MALCOLM MCKINNON, IMMIGRANTS AND CITIZENS: NEW ZEALANDERS AND 
ASIAN IMMIGRATION IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 36-43 (1996). 
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or parentage” were required to have an “entry permit.”80 Under the 
system permits were difficult to attain for non-British Europeans 
but were “virtually unattainable by non-Europeans” except in the 
uncommon instance where the Minister decreed that a certain 
number be issued.81 Where there were exceptions to the non-
European policy it was usually in favour of Pacific Islanders, the 
great majority of whom came from New Zealand-controlled 
territories. This racially discriminatory system was reaffirmed in the 
Immigration Act of 1964.82 The racial bias in the migration law did 
not escape notice from other States and was increasingly viewed by 
the public as antithetical to New Zealand’s international obligations 
and liberal values. In 1987 the Government eliminated the last 
official vestiges of the implicit “White New Zealand” immigration 
policy by removing the preferences given to “traditional source 
countries” of Great Britain, Northern Europe and North America.83 
New Zealand’s current immigration policy consists of three main 
categories: economic migrants (those individuals who have certain 
skills, occupations, entrepreneurial or business capacities), migrants 
who are admitted under family reunification rules and those 
admitted on humanitarian grounds. 
While domestic considerations remain paramount in 
migration policies and law, international norms and obligations 
have been increasingly influential since World War II. As 
mentioned above New Zealand generally restricted entry to persons 
of British or Irish parentage prior to World War II, but after the War 
international norms concerning the plight of displaced persons and 
refugees (due to the egregious human rights violations during the 
fighting and the Holocaust) became increasingly salient. 
Humanitarian considerations started to be considered alongside 
                                                
80 Sean Brawley, No 'White Policy' in NZ: Fact and Fiction in New Zealand's 
Asian Immigration Record, 1946–1978, 27 N.Z. J. OF HIST. 16, 19 (1993). 
81 Id. 
82 Kerry Burke, Review of Immigration Policy, August 1986, AUSTL. J. OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 42 (1986). 
83 The Immigration Act 1987 (NZ). 
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economic and country of origin criteria.84 Initially, these 
humanitarian considerations focused on refugees displaced by the 
conflict in Europe. After the War, the Government accepted 4,582 
displaced European refugees as well as displaced persons who 
arrived on International Refugee Organisation ships.85 In 1956 it 
agreed to a quota of 1,000 (later increased to 1,300) Hungarian 
refugees following the aborted anti-communist revolution.86 Section 
40 of the Immigration Act 1964 reinforced the growing 
humanitarian element in migration decisions in statute when it 
stated: “Nothing in this Act shall affect the prerogative of mercy.” 
This led to the practice where individuals who were subject to 
deportation would petition the Governor-General for a pardon, 
removing the underlying conviction that led to the deportation 
order.87 
As part of this general move toward including international 
legal considerations in migration decisions, New Zealand ratified 
the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in 1960, the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination in 1972, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1978 and the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC) in 
1993.88 These international obligations extended human rights and 
                                                
84 YOUCEF BOUANDEL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS (1997); 
Thomas Buergenthal, The Normative and Institutional Evolution of International 
Human Rights, 19 HUMAN RIGHTS Q. 703 (1997). 
85 New Zealand Parliament "Immigration chronology: selected events 1840-
2008" (Apr. 14, 2008) Parliamentary support: Research papers  
<www.parliament.nz>. 
86 Id. 
87 K.J. Keith, Administrative Law Developments in New Zealand as Seen 
Through Immigration Law, in INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CANADIAN ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DAVID MULLAN, 125, 128 (Huscroft & Michael 
Taggart eds., 2006). 
88 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (opened for 
signature 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954); International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 660 
U.N.T.S. 195 (opened for signature 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 
January 1969); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
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non-discriminatory protections to those seeking to enter the country 
when they had a well-founded fear of persecution, and provided 
that the appropriate due process and humanitarian considerations be 
accorded individuals gaining access to or being removed from New 
Zealand, regardless of the applicants’ irremediable characteristics. 
These international obligations are embedded in the 
Immigration Act 2009. The Act specifically incorporates New 
Zealand’s international obligations under the United Nations 
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); which now 
includes the category of “protected person” alongside “refugee” in 
the determination of deportation liability.89 The international legal 
instruments include protections for those individuals who can 
establish “substantial grounds for believing that [they] would be in 
danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel 
treatment if deported from New Zealand.”90 Consideration of both 
the substantive and procedural requirements of these instruments is 
mandatory when determining the validity of a migrant’s claims to 
be a refugee or a protected person as well as in the deportation of 
such persons.91 Moreover, the Act permits a deportation order 
quashed where an individual can demonstrate personal 
circumstances covered by “relevant” international obligations.92 
As international law was being reconceptualised from a 
body concerned with the rights of States inter se to one where 
individuals are recognised as having certain rights, there were 
parallel domestic developments in the law regarding the rights of 
immigrants and aliens. Prior to 1980 “aliens” had no right to be in 
the country except by approval of the Crown; there were few if any 
                                                
993 U.N.T.S. 3 (opened for signature 19 December 1966, entered into force 3 
January 1976) [ICESCR]; United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (opened for signature 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 
September 1990) [UNCROC]. 
89 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ss. 129–131 
90 Immigration Act 2009, c. 131(1). 
91 Id., at s. 164. 
92 Id., at s. 177. 
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protections for revocations of permits and immediate removal for 
aliens who did not have permission to be in the country. For 
example, the Court in Pagliara v. Attorney-General, which 
considered the issue of whether an alien who had been convicted of 
a crime would be entitled to a hearing concerning his deportation, 
noted (quoting Lord Denning): 
But in the case of aliens, it is rather different; for 
they have no right to be here except by licence of the 
Crown. And it has been held that the Home 
Secretary is not bound to hear representations on 
their behalf, even in the case of a deportation order, 
though, in practice, he usually does so.93 
After 1980 the courts gradually extended procedural 
protections to migrants. In Daganayasi v. Minister of Immigration 
the Court held that a decision by the Minister to deport Daganayasi 
was invalid because the Minister had not allowed the appellant a 
chance to see or respond to a medical report which created an 
incorrect impression that there would be little risk to the appellant’s 
child should he be forced to leave New Zealand with his parents.94 
This case signaled a fundamental shift in attitudes towards 
migrants. The general trend toward greater procedural protections 
was encouraged by the Bill of Rights Act 1990, which affirms the 
right of every person “to the observance of the principles of natural 
justice” in any administrative decision.95 The section was extended 
to the migration context when the Crown accepted that the section 
27 natural justice provisions applied to migrants in Attorney-
General v. Udompun.96 Subsequently the court of appeal extended 
the procedural rights accorded to potential deportees’ citizen 
children who would be affected by a deportation order.97 These 
considerations include addressing the fact that a citizen child’s 
                                                
93 Pagliara v Attorney-General [1974] 1 NZLR 86 (SC) 94 (quoting Schmidt v 
Secretary of State [1969] 1 All ER 904 (CA) 908–909). 
94 Daganayasi v Minister of Immigration [1980] 2 NZLR 130 (CA). 
95 Bill of Rights Act (1990) (NZ) at s. 27(1)(a). 
96 Attorney-General v Udompun [2005] 3 NZLR 204 (CA). 
97 Ye v Minister of Immigration [2008] NZCA 291, [2009] 2 NZLR 596; Huang 
v Minister of Immigration [2008] NZCA 377, [2009] 2 NZLR 700. 
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different status in his or her parents’ home country may adversely 
impact or subject them to discrimination.98 
Deportation in New Zealand Law 
Deportation orders are issued under Part 6 of the 
Immigration Act 2009 by the Minister of Immigration or Governor-
General when a non-citizen threatens national security or is 
convicted of certain criminal offences. The deportation provisions 
were designed in light of the Act’s overall objective to “better 
balance efficiency with fairness”99 in immigration matters and to 
“manage immigration in a way that balances the national interest, as 
determined by the Crown, and the rights of individuals,”100 while 
“implementing specified-related international obligations.”101 
Under the Act an aggrieved party may appeal to the 
Immigration Protection Tribunal (IPT) on a question of fact under 
section 201 or on humanitarian grounds under section 206. A 
person must file a humanitarian claim within the relevant time 
period specified by the Act, (which depends upon the liable 
deportee’s immigration status) and may not file an appeal where the 
individual has already “had a humanitarian appeal heard by the 
Tribunal in relation to a claim or a subsequent claim.”102 The 
grounds used by the IPT to evaluate a humanitarian appeal are set 
out in section 207 of the Act. The appeal must be allowed and the 
deportation order quashed if the IPT is satisfied that “there are 
exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would 
make it unjust or unduly harsh” for the appellant to be deported 
from New Zealand and “it would not in all the circumstances be 
contrary to the public interest to allow” the individual to remain in 
                                                
98 Ye v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76, [2010] 1 NZLR 104 at [60]–
[61]. 
99 Immigration Act 2009: Summary of Key Changes I MMIGRATION NEW 
ZEALAND (Dec. 2010), www.immigration.govt.nz. 
100 Immigration Act 2009, c. 3 (N.Z.). 
101 Immigration Act 2009, supra note 90. 
102 Immigration Act 2009, c. 206(3)(b) (N.Z.). 
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New Zealand.103 The appellant, while not carrying the burden of 
proof [contrary to the situation in Canada], has the responsibility to 
place material before the IPT which, if accepted, would allow the 
order to be quashed.104 
Doug Tennent, a lecturer at the University of Waikato,  
noted that the section 207 “unjust or unduly harsh” balancing test 
was the “highest of all thresholds” used in humanitarian appeals 
under the Immigration Act 1987, and it is clear that the test is a high 
bar to a successful humanitarian appeal.105 Generally, the “unjust” 
portion of the test refers to the unfairness and the negative impact 
the requirement to leave would have on the person given the time 
the person has spent in New Zealand and the commitment the 
individual (work, social intercourse, wealth generation activities) 
has shown to the country. The “unduly harsh” aspect of the test 
refers to the impact deportation would have on family members and 
on those to whom the liable deportees are emotionally close. 
The determination of these factual issues is complicated by 
several additional factors. First, precisely what qualifies as a 
“humanitarian” ground is not defined in the Act nor fully elucidated 
in case law. It is clear that the suffering and dangers to life which 
led to the enactment of the Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees, and the CAT, are “humanitarian” issues, as are such 
circumstances as the effects of family separation for families and 
children who have some members who have the right to stay in 
New Zealand. In addition, circumstances such as the existence of 
physical or mental infirmity, mental illness, where a person would 
be prejudiced or otherwise adversely affected by his or her race, 
ethnic origin, religion, nationality, sex or other status, or for their 
political opinions, or for an offence of a political character, may be 
considered.106 
These factors are not in themselves determinative but the 
material nature of a “humanitarian” factor in the test is dependent 
                                                
103 Id. c. 207. 
104 Faavae v Minister of Immigration [2000] NZAR 177 (CA). 
105 DOUGLAS TENNENT, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW 290 (2010). 
106 Bujak v The Minister of Justice [2009] NZCA 570 (SC). 
266 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY Vol. 35.2 
upon the individual circumstances and the context.107 However, 
where the impact on a potential deportee goes beyond the relatively 
narrow compass of a “well-founded” fear of physical harm or 
persecution, the humanitarian nature of a particular factor or status 
within a particular context is difficult to ascertain, and can often be 
an issue of semantics rather than legal standards or principles. As 
noted by Tipping J. in Ye v. Minister of Immigration: 
Article 3(1) [of the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child] provides that in all actions 
concerning children, by public and administrative 
authorities, the best interests of the child shall be “a 
primary consideration”. A primary consideration 
does not mean the primary consideration, much less 
the paramount consideration. There is no basis for 
reading in, as the appellants argued, the Care of 
Children Act 2004 standard of “first and paramount 
consideration”. That would not be consistent with 
the policy objectives which must be reconciled in 
cases of the present kind. . . . The Care of Children 
Act is not concerned with immigration matters in 
respect of which the Immigration Act states the 
relevant policies.108 
Second, these humanitarian grounds must be of an 
“exceptional” nature. As such, the usual impacts of physical and 
mental health, and those suffered by families who have members 
who are subject to deportation cannot be humanitarian “concerns” 
which the test may consider to allow for a successful appeal. As the 
Supreme Court has observed: 
The need for the circumstances of the case to be 
exceptional means that those circumstances must be 
well outside the normal run of circumstances found 
                                                
107 Minister of Immigration v Al-Hosan [2008] NZCA 462, [2009] NZAR 259 
(HC). 
108 Ye v Minister of Immigration [2008] NCZA 291, [2009] 2 NZLR 596 at [24]; 
see also Tipping J. Puli'uvea v Removal Review Authority [1996] 14 FRNZ 332 
(CA). 
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in overstayer cases generally. The circumstances do 
not have to be unique or very rare but they do have 
to be truly an exception rather than the rule.109 
The high and relatively amorphous standard under section 
207 of the Immigration Act 2009 is a significant change from the 
1987 Act. In addition to the “unjust or unduly harsh” evaluation, the 
1987 Act outlined a set of criteria to assist the appeals tribunal and 
the courts in determining the quality and scope of the humanitarian 
concerns of the deportee.110 These factors did not preclude the 
Tribunal from considering other factors but gave a structure to the 
inquiry while setting a minimum standard for judicial review.111 
Sections 22 and 105 of the Immigration Act 1987, while using the 
same “unjust or unduly harsh” test carried over into the 2009 Act, 
but the set of criteria established in section 22(6) by the 1987 Act 
was not in the subsequent legislation. Hence, in place of the seven-
prong requirements of inquiry under the Immigration Act 1987, the 
2009 Act merely requires a balance of the individual interest 
(exceptional humanitarian concerns resulting in an injustice or 
unduly harsh outcome beyond mere repatriation but not to the level 
of those faced by a refugee or protected person) and the 
community’s interest, to permit the individual’s continued presence 
                                                
109 Ye v Minister of Immigration [2008] NZCA 29, [2009] 2 NZLR 596 at [34] 
(footnote omitted). 
110 Immigration Act 1987 (N.Z.), c. 22.6. These factors include: 
(a) the appellant's age; 
(b) the length of the period during which the appellant has been in New Zealand 
lawfully; 
(c) the appellant's personal and domestic circumstances; 
(d) the appellant's work record; 
(e) the nature of the offence or offences of which the appellant has been 
convicted and from which the liability for deportation arose; 
(f) the nature of any other offences of which the appellant has been convicted; 
(g) the interests of the appellant's family; and 
(h) such other matters as the Tribunal considers relevant (see s 2). 
111 See generally Al-Hosan v Deportation Review Tribunal [2007] HC Auckland 
CIV 2006-404-3923; Minister of Immigration v Al-Hosan,[2008] NZCA 462, 
[2009] NZAR 259 (HC). 
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in New Zealand.112 The community interest can be understood as 
the public interest in the deportation of the individual given the 
seriousness of the conviction and the likelihood of reoffending (for 
example, issues of social cohesion, public confidence, deterrence 
and repugnance of the public to the particular offence). 
Despite the narrow scope necessitated by section 207 in the 
humanitarian appeal and the deportation process, there are 
international obligations, which can inform both the admission and 
removal of individuals in the appeals process under the Act. The 
Act specifically incorporates New Zealand’s international 
obligations under both the CAT and the ICCPR while enacting the 
international law category of “protected person” alongside the 
previously enacted category of “refugee.” In addition, the Act 
consistently makes reference to “international obligations” which 
should be considered by immigration officials when making 
determinations on deportation orders. Section 177, which allows for 
a deportation order to be quashed, specifically mentions 
“international obligations.” Under the section, an immigration 
officer may cancel a deportation order at his or her “absolute 
discretion” where a “person provides information to the officer 
concerning his or her personal circumstances” and “the information 
is relevant to New Zealand’s international obligations.”113 While 
there is no right of appeal under this section, nor is the officer 
required to act on any information offered, the officer must, if 
exercising his or her discretion to cancel an order “have regard to 
any [relevant] international obligations”, whether the consideration 
is at the prospective deportee’s behest or not.114 The officer is not 
bound to issue any written justification for a decision under section 
177(4)(a), but is “obliged to record [. . . .] a description of the 
international obligations; and [. . . .] the facts about the person’s 
personal circumstances” wherever the officer has “regard to any 
international obligations”.115 Presumably, the record or summation 
                                                
112 Immigration Act 2009 at s. 207. 
113 Immigration Act 2009 (N.Z.), ss 177(1), 177 (2). 
114 Id. at ss. 177; 175(5), 
115 Id. at 175(5). 
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made at this juncture is carried forward in any later appeal of the 
deportation order. It does however raise the spectre of more 
informed or knowledgeable officers taking a greater proactive 
approach in applying “international obligations” to individuals 
presenting relevant grounds for official consideration. 
In addition to the explicit international obligations 
mentioned in the Act, the courts have in certain instances read in 
other international obligations created by the Government. First, the 
courts, where not explicitly precluded from doing so, “should strive 
to interpret legislation consistently with the treaty obligations of 
New Zealand.”116 Second, where the treaty obligation has not yet 
been incorporated into statute but where the principles and rules 
reflect fundamental common law values and the rights outlined in 
the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) the courts will apply a 
presumption of consistency.117 In Zaoui v. Attorney-General (No 2) 
the Supreme Court held that the presumption of consistency in 
favour of international obligations provided for certain substantive 
and procedural requirements within the context of the Immigration 
Act 1987.118 Nevertheless, the extent to which courts are to include 
international norms or interpret statutes consistently with 
international obligations – particularly those international 
obligations which have not been directly incorporated into domestic 
law – remains largely unresolved. However, the issue highlights the 
differential impacts of diverse interpretive approaches where courts 
are seeking to reasonably balance the protected rights in light of 
subsequent statutory language infringing upon those rights. 
After a determination of deportation liability there may be 
an appeal to the courts. The judicial review authority in 
immigration cases exists regardless of the extent of the 
discretionary power the executive branch exercises in a particular 
decision. There are two types of review: an appeal on a point of law 
                                                
116 Puli'uvea v Removal Review Auth. [1996] 14 FRNZ 322 (CA). See also 
Puli'uvea v Removal Review Auth.[1996] 3 NZLR 538 (CA) 542. 
117 Michael Taggart, Rugby, The Anti-apartheid Movement, and Administrative 
Law, in PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION: THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 82 (Rick Bigwood ed., 2006). 
118 Zaoui v Attorney-General (No 2) [2005] 1 NZLR 577 (SC). 
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and judicial review. An appeal on a point of law argues that the 
substantive and procedural law relating to the case have been 
incorrectly interpreted or applied. Judicial review concerns whether 
the decision has been reached in a manner that is in accordance with 
the law in a fair and reasonable manner.119 
Prior to the passage of the 2009 Act the scope of review was 
limited. However the incorporation of international obligations, the 
congruence of many substantive and procedural rights claimed in 
migration proceedings with fundamental common law rights, and 
rights guaranteed by the NZBORA had seemingly pushed the courts 
to observe a more assertive stance and exacting standard of review. 
For example, Baragwanath J. in Ding v. Minister of Immigration 
                                                
119 Wolf v Minister of Immigration (2004) HRNZ 469 (HC); TENNENT , supra 
note 105, at 296. "A hard-look approach or heightened level of intensity of 
review is appropriate, but even on a Wednesbury analysis the immigration officer 
acted unreasonably and irrationally": Bugdaycay v Sec’y of State for the Home 
Dep’t [1987] 1 AC 514 (HL) 531 per Bridge LJ; R (Mahmood) v Sec’y of State 
for the Home Dep’t [2001] 1 WLR 840 (CA) 18; Pharm. Mgmt. Agency Ltd. v 
Roussel Uclaf Austl. Pty Ltd.[1998] NZAR 58 (CA) 66; Discount Brands Ltd v 
Westfield (New Zealand) Ltd [2005] NZSC 17, [2005] 2 NZLR 597 at [54] per 
Keith J and 116per Blanchard J (with Richardson J agreeing at 179; R (Daly) v 
Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2001] 2 AC 532; and R v Ministry of Defence, 
ex p Smith [1996] QB 517 (CA) 554 per Thomas Bingham MR. The level of 
intensity depends upon the nature of the right being interfered with: the more 
fundamental the right the higher the intensity of review. The right at issue here is 
the right of a child to be looked after by its natural parents, which is an important 
right even if not protected by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act [NZBORA]. 
The NZBORA is not an exhaustive statement of rights (s 28). Article 3(1) of the 
UNCROC and arts 17, 23 and 24 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights [ICCPR] place the rights and interests of a child as rights and 
interests of the highest order. The circumstances of this case, which involve the 
separation of children (who are New Zealand citizens) from their parent and 
guardian, call for "anxious scrutiny" and the highest intensity of review. Intensity 
of review of the ss 54 and/or 58 decisions depends upon the whole context (R 
(Daly) v Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2001] UKHL 26 at 548). The whole 
context includes the best interests of the children who are either about to be 
removed from their country of citizenship or who are about to have their mother 
removed from them. The context is not limited by the existence and language of s 
47(3) of the Immigration Act 1987. Ye v Minister of Immigration, [2008] NZCA 
291 at [111–112]. 
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advocated a higher level of scrutiny in those immigration cases 
where a child might be adversely affected: 
The Crown is right in its argument that the state 
interest in immigration control means that it is an 
area in which courts traditionally show great 
deference to the policy of the Executive. But to 
maintain in cases of risk to a citizen child a bare 
Wednesbury standard of whether the decision-maker 
took that consideration into account but without 
awareness of the consequences to the child of an 
adverse decision, however appropriate for a child 
who is an alien, is difficult to reconcile with the 
concurrent Crown obligation of protection of the 
citizen child. To accept such low level intensity of 
review is equally difficult to square with the Courts’ 
parens patriae role in relation to citizen children.120 
However, the elimination of the humanitarian tests in 
sections 105 and 22 of the 1987 Act as well as the procedure set out 
in section 171 to quash a deportation order has re-entrenched a 
more limited standard of review and has potentially severely 
circumscribed the ability of the courts to review migration 
decisions, particularly in light of humanitarian and human rights 
issues. The effects of these changes, particularly the elimination of 
the seven-pronged humanitarian test in the 2009 Act, are evident in 
the recent decision by Lang J. in Babulal v Chief Executive 
Department of Labour.121 Lang J. notes that a low Wednesbury 
standard of review is not new in immigration cases122 and observes 
that section 177 was enacted “as a direct legislative response to [. . 
                                                
120 Ding v Minister of Immigration (2006) 25 FRNZ 568 (HC) 260. See also 
TENNENT, supra note 105, at 298–301. 
121 Yatish Suresh Babulal v. Chief Exec. Dep’t of Labour CIV-2011-404-1773. 
122 Id. at 37. See also Huang v Minister of Immigration, above n 27, at [67] per 
William Young J: 
“… the Court should ensure that the best interests of an affected child were 
genuinely taken into account as a primary consideration but, beyond that, how 
conflicting considerations are weighted is for the decision maker and not the 
court unless unreasonableness considerations can be successfully invoked. 
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..]Ye [. . ..] and Huang” and stands for the proposition that an 
immigration officer is no longer under any obligation “to have 
regard to the humanitarian grounds” set forth in section 207.123 
Lang J. continues to hold that the highly deferential 
Wednesbury reasonableness standard is a sufficient standard of 
review and explicitly rejects Babulal’s request that the Court 
employ the “hard look” approach due to the probable “severe 
impact [. . ..] [on] Babulal’s daughters.”124 First, Lang J. rejects the 
“hard look” argument because the wording of section 177 gives 
expansive discretion to the executive. He notes that there is no right 
to apply for a cancellation order and “no obligation to have regard 
to the humanitarian grounds”125 when making a decision (or non-
decision) under the section. Further, the immigration officer is 
under no obligation to provide reasons for not cancelling a 
deportation order unless the officer “has had regard to New 
Zealand’s international obligations.”126 However rather than a 
detailed explanation and analysis of a section 177 decision, this 
requirement, in Lang J’s view, simply calls for “description of the 
[international] obligations” and a recording of “facts about the 
personal circumstances of the person subject to the order.”127 There 
is no “obligation to give reasons for his or her decision.”128 Second, 
the procedure requires that the officer supply a restricted amount of 
information relating only to the relevant international obligations 
when making a record of the decision. This restricted information 
enables only the barest Wednesbury scrutiny: 
[W]here an immigration officer makes a decision 
that requires him or her to have regard to New 
Zealand’s international obligations, Parliament 
intended the record of the decision to contain 
sufficient information to allow the decision to be 
judicially reviewed within a very narrow compass. It 
                                                
123 Yatish Suresh Babulal, CIV-2011-202-1733 at 20. 
124 Id. at 24. 
125 Id. at 20 & 28. 
126 Id. at 28. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 33. 
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accepted that the court must have sufficient 
information to be able to determine whether the 
immigration officer who made the decision took into 
account the international obligations relevant to the 
particular case. The requirement to record the facts 
relating to the personal circumstances of the person 
subject to the deportation order also provides the 
court with the ability to determine whether the 
ultimate decision was reasonable in a Wednesbury 
sense, but no more than that.129 
Third, the failure to mention particular “international 
obligations” that an officer must have regard to when choosing not 
to quash the order, as well as the elimination of any humanitarian 
requirement and seven-pronged test in the new statute, limits the 
ability of the court to undertake a “hard look” review of the 
decision for material errors of law because there is little law or facts 
“there” to review. Lang J. acknowledges that an attempt to totally 
fetter judicial review of an administrative decision must be read 
down, but that in this case “judicial review [.. . .] [is] based on an 
alleged failure by an immigration officer to have regard to New 
Zealand’s international obligations when reaching his or her 
decision.”130 However, the salient aspect of the statute is the 
absence of statutory language that might provide for stricter 
scrutiny: 
The absence of any requirement to give reasons tells 
against an expectation by Parliament that the 
decision will be subject to close scrutiny by the 
courts, because a lack of reasons will virtually 
inevitably compromise such an undertaking. As a 
result, even if the court wished to take a “hard” or 
“anxious” look at such a decision, it would struggle 
do so.131 
                                                
129 Yatish Suresh Babulal, CIV-2011-202-1733 at 36. 
130 Id. at 31. 
131 Id. at 32. 
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The upshot of this is that judicial review of a decision under 
section 177 is necessarily minimal, regardless of the humanitarian 
or international obligations arguments put forward. Since 
Parliament chose not to require a specific justification under section 
177, Lang J. held that there was little necessary documentation to 
review the decision.132 For Lang J., the standard immigration 
officer’s consideration record need amount to little more than a 
docket list of documents containing humanitarian concerns and an 
incongruous index to “international obligations” to which the 
official has had regard, concluding with a note that the officer is 
“not obliged to provide reasons” for his decision upholding the 
deportation order.133 Likewise the Court is not required to scrutinise 
the list when it looks, on balance, to be in order. As a result, 
Babulal’s deportation is reasonable and his appeal dismissed. 
This raises a major problem, because the Court’s supposed 
knowledge, comes without a record and without resorting to a “hard 
look” analysis. Moreover, the relevant obligations are unlikely 
reasonably interpreted when there is only a (non-exclusive) 
summary of the factors used in the decision. In effect, the 
Wednesbury standard under the circumstances leaves little, if any, 
room for the court to review the efficacy of international obligations 
in the particular circumstances. The test, as set forth in Babulal 
simply requires an executive listing of some international 
obligations and personal circumstances. There is no judicial inquiry, 
(nor can there be given the paucity of information), into whether or 
how the obligations or personal circumstances were considered. 
The resultant decision will always be “reasonable” under 
Wednesbury since the ultimate test is the mere balancing of 
probabilities between the public interest in permitting the proposed 
deportee to remain and the international obligations or humanitarian 
factors under consideration. 
                                                
132 Id. at ¶ 35. 
133 Immigration Act 2009 s. 177 3(b)(1). 
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IV. UNITED STATES: 
Overview of U.S. Immigration and Removal Policy 
A common approach to the study of U.S. immigration is to 
view the development of the immigration system into four historical 
periods.134 The first period, from 1789-1874 was a period of 
relatively unrestricted entry to the U.S. and limited grounds for 
deportation. The second period, from 1875-1917, was marked by 
both tighter controls on who could legally enter the U.S. as well as 
an expansion of grounds for expulsion. There were also two 
important attributes to this second period: a sharp rise in 
immigration to the U.S. and a shift from state-based immigration 
policies to Federal supremacy.135 An even more rigorously 
controlled immigration context emerged during World War I and 
later with the Red Scare (and Palmer Raids) in 1919-1920. This 
period also witnessed the creation of the U.S. Border Patrol in 
1924.136 These controls were lessened, however, between 1941 and 
1980, largely in response to the displacement of individuals during 
the Second World War and the following Cold War. A restrictive 
turn in immigration policy re-emerged with the election of Ronald 
Reagan as U.S. president in 1980. After several years of 
congressional bargaining over immigration law reforms, the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act 1986 (IRCA) was adopted. 
Among other things, the law sought both to provide sanctions to 
employers knowingly employing undocumented workers, largely 
from Mexico, and move towards legalizing many undocumented 
workers. 
The power to remove or deport aliens has a long history in 
the U. S. Generally the classes of those considered “undesirable” 
has grown more numerous. Along with these developments, a set of 
regulatory and legal standards have arisen, which accords a large 
                                                
134 DAVID M. HEER, IMMIGRATION IN AMERICA’S FUTURE: SOCIAL SCIENCE 
FINDINGS AND THE POLICY DEBATE (1996). 
135 See also MOLONEY, supra note 6, at 25. 
136 HEER, supra note 134, at 47. 
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amount of executive discretion to oversee the immigration system. 
Bill Hing, a professor at the University of San Francisco, notes that 
the first federal power to deport aliens from the U.S. (though never 
used) was found in the Alien Friends Act (1798), which was part of 
the Alien and Sedition Laws.137 
The power to deport, albeit one appearing again in narrow 
form, would not appear again until 1888. By 1891, however, 
deportation authority was back to stay. The Immigration Act 1891 
permitted the exclusion and/or deportation of many ‘undesirables’ 
(prostitutes, certain criminals, the mentally ill, polygamists, those 
likely to become public charges, those suffering from certain 
diseases and Chinese labourers).138 By 1903 the statute included 
two additional lines of limitation for immigrants: (1) the statute of 
limitations was increased from one to three years from date of entry 
(except in the case of public charges, who were held to a two-year 
standard); and (2) the statute expanded the class of inadmissible 
aliens to include epileptics, those who suffered insanity within five 
years of entry or those having had more than one episode of 
insanity over the course of their lives, beggars, anarchists and 
importers of prostitutes.139 Additional restrictions were added a few 
years later when Congress added ‘imbeciles’, the ‘feeble-minded’, 
those with tuberculosis, unaccompanied children suspected of moral 
turpitude, immoral woman and those with physical or mental defect 
that might limit ability to work in 1907.140 
A decade later, in 1917, in the wake of anarchist disruptions, 
the World War in Europe and on the eve of the Red Scare, 
‘illiterates’, those of ‘constitutional psychopathic inferiority’, 
alcoholics, those who had suffered more than one episode of 
‘insanity’, Hindus and other ‘Asiatics’ were also forbidden.141 In 
addition the 1917 Act established a five-year statute of limitations 
on deportations for those found violating the Immigration Act. 
                                                
137 BILL ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 209 
(2004). 
138 Id.at 210. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Immigration Act 1917. 
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However, aliens sentenced to a year’s imprisonment for a crime 
involving moral turpitude, those advancing the overthrow of 
government by force and violence, and those practicing or 
connected with prostitution were deportable irrespective of their 
length of residence.142 In 1918 and 1920 Congress authorized the 
exclusion and expulsion of anarchists including those individuals 
possessing explosives (even if evidence of anarchist activity could 
not be established) and in 1922 narcotic offenders were added to the 
list. In 1924, those overstaying their visas, regardless of family ties, 
length of stay or other mitigating factors, were subject to 
deportation without time limitations. 
A critical juncture in deportation matters in the U.S. 
occurred in 1931 when Reuben Oppenheimer authored a report on 
the subject as part of the National Commission on Law Observance 
and Enforcement (Wickersham Commission). The report outlined 
considerable problems with the deportation process since it merged 
‘investigatory, prosecutor, and judgment functions’.143 
Oppenheimer emphasised the human rights concerns at the heart of 
deportation and noted the U.S. Supreme Court’s own dicta in Fong 
Yue Ting v. United States (1893) lamenting the dire impact of 
forcibly removing an alien from his or her family, community and 
possessions.144 While scholars, such as Moloney, point out that no 
substantive changes can be directly linked to Oppenheimer’s report, 
it marks the first time such concerns became part of the official 
record. 
By 1952, substantial attention was being paid to deportation 
on the national level. The Immigration Act 1952 essentially 
consolidated many of the restrictions found in the earlier acts but 
also provided for relief from deportation such as the suspension 
provision (which was later deemed unconstitutional on other 
grounds145), the opportunity for voluntary departure, adjustment of 
status, and stay of deportation.146 The law eliminated time 
                                                
142 Id. 
143 MOLONEY, supra note 6, at 204. 
144 Id. at 205. 
145 I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
146 HING, supra note 137, at 211. 
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limitations on most deportations.147 Most notable about this law was 
its creation of fair hearing procedures before a special officer.148 
The Immigration Act 1965 eliminated national origin immigration 
quotas, establishing new criteria for immigrants.149 As immigration 
has increased from Latin America, particularly Mexico, resulting in 
a large pool of illegal immigrants new attempts were made to 
reform the system in the Immigrant Reform and Control Act of 
1986 and the Immigration Act of 1990. However this legislation has 
been unable to reconcile the often contradictory political and 
economic imperative and balance natural rights (or civil rights) 
notions of individual immigrants versus a positivist notion of the 
rights and security approach to American borders. 
An Overview of the U.S. Removals Process 
The issue of immigration policy is a perennial, politically 
polarising issue in the U.S. Immigration policy debates are 
complicated, involving economic, due process and human rights 
and national security concerns of which deportations and removals 
are only on aspect. Nevertheless, removals involve a significant 
numbers of individuals. In FY 2013, the U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement Agency reported 133,551 removals.150 While 
questions of defining the American political community is the 
domain of Congress and the President, American jurisprudence is 
marked by the role of courts in defining the contours of public 
                                                
147 Id. (some grounds for deportation continued to be limited, such as 
confinement in a mental institution, becoming a public charge or any conviction 
for a violation of alien registration requirements). 
148 Id. 
149 These are: (1) unmarried adult sons and daughters of citizens; (2) spouses and 
unmarried sons and daughters of permanent residents; (3) professionals, 
scientists, and artists of exceptional ability; (4) married adult sons and daughters 
of U.S. citizens; (5) siblings of adult citizens; (6) workers, skilled and unskilled, 
in occupations for which labor was in short supply in the U.S.; and (7) refugees 
from Communist-dominated countries or those uprooted by natural catastrophe. 
150 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), ERO Annual Report 
(2013) https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/2013-ice-immigration-
removals.pdf. 
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policy insofar as it affects liberty interests. In the immigration 
policy domain, however, U.S. courts, have historically deferred to 
Congress (or the President) in determining process rights for 
migrants facing deportation. Similar to courts in New Zealand and 
Canada, U.S. courts will review final decisions, under very limited 
circumstances, to ensure they conform to only the most minimal of 
process rights consistent with the U.S. Constitution. 
In the 19th century, immigration regulation function was 
seen as part of the constitution’s sovereign powers, arising in part 
due to the notion that immigration policy implicates foreign 
relations power, which is an exclusively federal realm.151 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has consistently noted that “over no conceivable 
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is 
over the admission of aliens.”152 While the U.S. Constitution was 
silent on this particular point, the Supreme Court in Fong Yue Ting 
held that constitutional protections do not apply to removal of 
resident aliens.153 However, it has long acknowledged the severity 
of deportations when noting that removal “may result . . .. in loss of 
both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living” and 
has required some measure of due process under the 5th and 14th 
                                                
151 “It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has 
the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid 
the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such 
cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. In the U.S. this 
power is vested in the national government, to which the Constitution has 
committed the entire control of international relations, in peace as well as in war. 
It belongs to the political department of the government, and may be exercised 
either through treaties made by the President and Senate, or through statutes 
enacted by Congress, upon whom the Constitution has conferred power to 
regulate commerce with foreign nations, including the entrance of ships, the 
importation of goods and the bringing of persons into the ports of the U.S.; to 
establish a uniform rule of naturalization; to declare war, and to provide and 
maintain armies and navies; and to make all laws which may be necessary and 
proper for carrying into effect these powers and all other powers vested by the 
Constitution in the government of the U.S. or in any department or officer 
thereof.” Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (citation 
omitted). 
152 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977). 
153 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
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Amendments and a habeas corpus action if unlawfully 
incarcerated.154 Yet it has held that these proceedings are 
nonetheless administrative, hence civil not criminal in nature. As 
such, as non-criminal proceedings, the individual is not entitled to 
the full protections of the U.S. Constitution including having 
limited basic rights such as the ability to cross-examine witnesses or 
the option to petition for a pardon.155 Noted by the Court in Fong 
Yue Ting: 
The order of deportation is not a punishment for 
crime. It is not a banishment, in the sense in which 
that word is often applied to the expulsion of a 
citizen from his country by way of punishment. It is 
but a method of enforcing the return to his own 
country of an alien who has not complied with the 
conditions upon the performance of which the 
government of the nation, acting within its 
constitutional authority, and through the proper 
departments, has determined that his continuing to 
reside here shall depend.156 
Thus, the courts have permitted Congress and the President 
wide latitude in this area, with the concomitant limited recourse for 
the immigrant facing deportation. Executive decisions to exclude or 
deport were considered by the courts to be part of the executive’s 
authority under plenary powers doctrine, and not subject to judicial 
review. As such removal decisions are based on a habeas corpus 
review with expansive deference to Executive prerogatives and 
legal conclusions. The courts refused to review the factual basis of 
the decisions.157 
                                                
154 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276,284 (1922); Wan Shing v. United States, 
140 U.S. 424 (1891). 
155 MOLONEY, supra note 6, at 199. 
156 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730. 
157 “Until the enactment of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, the sole 
means by which an alien could test the legality of his or her deportation order was 
by bringing a habeas corpus action in district court. In such cases, other than the 
question whether there was some evidence to support the order, the courts 
generally did not review factual determinations made by the Executive. However, 
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The continuing rise in deportations has its policy origins in 
the 1990s with the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Its policy origins are 
further rooted within the political context of that era demanding a 
firmer law and order posture in domestic criminal justice policy.158 
Importantly, these changes were made retroactively, ensnaring 
many individuals who had lived nearly their entire lives in the U.S. 
in removal proceedings, and eventually on to countries in which 
they had little to no family or community networks.159 These 
individuals were not afforded a right to counsel (counsel could be 
procured at the detained individual’s own expense) during the 
Bureau of Immigration Appeals process. The 1996 Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) also limited habeas 
corpus rights for non-citizens. At the same time, the rise in 
removals has often led to indefinite detention awaiting removal and 
has led to domestic and international criticism. The 2005 REAL ID 
Act continued to tighten removal provisions, narrow appeals rights 
to aggrieved non-citizens and expand the scope of terror-related 
activity making an alien inadmissible or deportable, as well as 
ineligible for certain forms of relief from removal.160 
Removal proceedings are handled either through a normal 
process with a hearing before an immigration judge and subsequent 
appeals procedure or an “expedited track.”  Expedited removals are 
conducted for aliens who are convicted of ‘aggravated felonies’.161 
These proceedings are meant to occur while the inmate is 
incarcerated for the underlying offense and can even be entered at 
time of sentencing by a U.S. District Court judge provided certain 
conditions are met.162 This process is required by statute to adhere 
                                                
they did review the Executive's legal determinations.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 
289, 306 (2001). 
158 MOLONEY, supra note 6. 
159 Id. at 219. 
160 MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE & TODD TATELMAN, 
CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS, IMMIGRATION: ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR 
PROVISIONS OF THE REAL ID ACT OF 2005 (2005). 
161 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (a)(3) (2013). 
162 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (c)(1). 
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to only minimal due process or natural justice principles. Evidence 
must be received, a record maintained and the prospective deportee 
must have adequate notice and information concerning the grounds 
for deportation.163 Monitoring and evaluation is provided by the 
Attorney General and Comptroller General. Essentially, the process 
is designed in order to verify the prospective deportees’ identity and 
to affirm the grounds for removal. There is a limited right to appeal 
afforded the prospective deportee.164 
The usual process is where the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) commences a removal proceeding of a non-citizen 
it wishes to remove by serving a “notice to appear” on the 
immigrant individuals non-citizen.165 DHS is usually represented by 
an assistant chief counsel in Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), an agency of DHS. The immigration judges are part of the 
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ), which is a part of 
the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and operates 
under the authority of the Attorney-General. Unlike the process 
currently employed in New Zealand, for example, prospective 
deportees are permitted a hearing in front of the immigration judge, 
who must conduct an impartial proceeding where the DHS and the 
non-citizen are opposing parties.166 An opportunity for the 
production of evidence, including testimony, is afforded the 
prospective deportee. At the same time, this is not a judicial 
proceeding but an administrative one, employing a lower standard 
of proof justifying deportation and far fewer protections than a 
criminal defendant is afforded. The burden of proof is on the non-
citizen to show they are admissible or non-deportable.167 
As an initial matter, the immigration judge determines if the 
immigrant may be removed under any of the statutorily enumerated 
                                                
163 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (b)(4)(A)-(F). 
164 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (3)(A)(i). 
165 I owe a description of the initial determination and review process discussed 
below to Stephen H. Legomsky, author of Fortieth Annual Administrative Law 
Issue: Immigration Law and Adjudication: Restructuring Immigration 
Adjudication, 59 Duke L.J. 1635, 1641-44 (2010). 
166 8 U.S.C § 1229. 
167 8 U.S.C § 1229 (c)(2). 
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grounds, such as criminal activity, security risks, or unlawful entry 
into the U.S.168 If the judge determines that the individual is either 
inadmissible or subject to removal, the immigration judge then 
decides any affirmative applications for relief (i.e. asylum and a 
narrower remedy called “restriction on removal”169) which may 
have been filed by the immigrant.170 The judge then renders an oral 
or written decision at the conclusion of the hearing which includes a 
formal order directing the person be removed from the U.S., 
terminating the proceedings, or otherwise disposing of the case.171 
Either of the parties may appeal the decisions to the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which is part of EOIR under the 
authority of the Department of Justice and the Attorney General.  A 
filing of an appeal must be made within thirty (30) days of the 
immigration judge’s decision and order and automatically stays the 
initial order pending the outcome of the appeal. The attorney 
general appoints the members of the BIA, establishes its procedures 
and can review individual decisions.172 A large majority of the 
cases decided by the BIA are decided by single member panels and, 
within a specified number of categories, may be made by providing 
reasons. The appellate process entails a review of the immigration 
judge’s legal conclusions and discretionary decisions de novo, but 
due to reforms enacted in 2002, the appellate review may not 
                                                
168 8 U.S.C §§ 1182, 1227. 
169 “Asylum, which is discretionary, enables the recipient to remain in the U.S. 
and, subject to some limitations, to bring in a spouse and children. Withholding 
of removal merely immunizes the person from return to the country in which his 
or her life or freedom is threatened (not from return to a third country), and it 
makes no provision for the admission of family members.” Legomsky, supra 
note 165, at 1642 n.19. 
170 8 U.S.C § 1229a(c)(4)(A) (the consideration of properly filed affirmative 
applications for relief usually a determination of whether the individual has met 
the statutory requirements for relief an whether the discretion of the judge should 
be exercised under the individual circumstances). 
171 8 C.F.R. § 1240. 
172 8 C.F.R. § 1003. 
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reverse factual findings, including credibility determinations, unless 
they are “clearly erroneous.”173 
The Federal Court may review the BIA decision and lower 
decision by the immigration judge.  The judicial review is not done 
in the federal district court. Rather the only procedure for obtaining 
a review of an immigration decision to file a review petition in the 
court of appeals for the circuit in which the initial immigration 
hearing took place. The petition must be filed within thirty (30) 
days of the final order of removal and cannot be extended.174 
Consistent with the idea that immigration matters are issues 
of a “political” nature, there are significant restrictions of the 
judicial review process. First, The Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) 
barred judicial review of removal orders for non-citizens convicted 
of certain crimes.175 Second, it prevents judicial review of certain 
discretionary acts and decisions in the immigration process of the 
Attorney General and his agents. As amended in 1996 and 2005, the 
INA precludes judicial review of certain discretionary waivers from 
removal, as well as any other discretionary decision (except for the 
grant of asylum), while constitutional claims and questions of law 
remain reviewable by the courts of appeals.176 Third, the appeals 
court may not remand cases to the BIA for further fact finding 
under the Hobbs Act standard, which allows for the court to require 
further fact finding where the additional evidence is material and 
there exists reasonable grounds for failure to adduce the evidence 
before the agency.177 Finally, with passage of the REAL ID Act in 
2005178 Congress eliminated habeas jurisdiction for removal orders 
                                                
173 Jill E. Family, Stripping Judicial Review During Immigration Reform: The 
Certificate of Reviewability, 8 Nev. L.J. 499, 502-03 (2008). 
174 Id. 
175 Id, 
176 Report to the House of Delegates, A.B.A. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION, 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ 
Judicial_Review_of_Immigration_Decisions_1.authcheckdam.pdf. 
177 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c). 
178 Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005). 
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(except expedited removal). The courts of appeals continue to 
review constitutional claims and questions of law and have 
authority for habeas corpus review. 
Deportation Under U.S. Laws 
There are several grounds under current U.S. law upon 
which one may be deported. Besides the rather pedestrian matters 
related to visa applications used to gain entry to the country are, 
grounds for deportation include: smuggling179; marriage fraud180; 
assorted criminal offences, including aggravated felonies181, failure 
to register as a sex offender182 and drug related convictions183; 
being a drug abuser or addict184; firearms offenses185; espionage186; 
domestic violence and violations of protection orders187; 
trafficking188; being a public charge within five years of arrival in 
U.S.189; being an unlawful voter190; and the rather amorphous 
category of those deemed not to be within the American ‘foreign 
policy’ interest.191 
Importantly, U.S. immigration law provides a sliding scale 
of process rights afforded to a prospective deportee based on the 
factual circumstances leading to the person’s presence and grounds 
for removal. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), for 
                                                
179 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(1)(E). 
180 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(1)(G). 
181 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(A)(iii) (aggravated felonies are defined in 8 USC § 
1101(a)(43) and include such serious violent offenses as rape (A), murder (A) 
and sexual abuse of a minor (A) but also include offenses such as forgery (R), 
theft (G) and prostitution (K)). 
182 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(A)(v). 
183 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(B). 
184 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(B)(ii). 
185 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(C). 
186 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(D). 
187 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(E). 
188 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(F). 
189 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(5). 
190 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(6). 
191 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(4)(C). 
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instance, distinguishes between circumstances of the migrant’s 
arrival in the U.S. and grounds for deportation arising from criminal 
convictions. Moreover, the removal policy has been marked by a 
shift towards encouraging prospective deportees to voluntarily 
depart the U.S., thereby waiving their due process rights all 
together.192 These ‘voluntary departures’ are handled at the 
immigration officer stage with the individuals electing this process 
never appearing before a judge. This may benefit migrants because 
they are more quickly freed to return to their home country rather 
than face the possibility of indeterminate detention in the U. S. 
(awaiting final determination of their deportation).193 In addition, 
since the individual voluntarily returned, their ability to apply to 
return to the U.S. is significantly shorter than those individuals 
contesting deportation who are ultimately involuntarily removed. 
This option is unavailable to ‘aggravated felons’ and those 
suspected of terrorist links. 
While this mechanism is of increasing importance in the 
execution of U.S. immigration policy, use of the immigration judge 
process is still the most common form of removal. These quasi-
judicial proceedings operate in a manner similar to normal court 
proceedings with evidence and testimony. In addition, individuals 
can choose to enter into a stipulated order of removal at this stage, 
which foregoes the full proceeding. This approach has proven 
controversial since many such agreements are executed without the 
benefit of counsel, an otherwise fundamental right in the U.S. 
Another vehicle for case resolution in the immigration judge stage 
of proceedings is through the ‘expedited removal proceeding’ 
established by the 1996 Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). This special process applies only to 
those immigrants who are not seeking asylum or are similarly 
situated individuals who entered unlawfully and have been in the 
U.S. for less than two years and are otherwise ineligible for 
admission to the U.S. as normal applicants, often due to defects in 
                                                
192 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (c). 
193 There are however significant issues regarding due process in these 
situations. See United States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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the visa application process.194 This process has been used primarily 
in border contexts. 
The INA also permits expedited removals for so-called 
‘aggravated felons’.195 This process is more akin to the New 
Zealand deportation process in that it circumvents the judicial (or 
quasi-judicial) process all together. Here, an executive official 
serves a document called a ‘Final Administrative Deportation 
Order’ on the aggravated felon proposed for removal. This provides 
for an executive review (without a judge) and a hearing where the 
proposed deportee can review evidence against them and be 
represented by counsel (though counsel will not be provided for 
them at state expense). This second official receives all of the 
evidence submitted by the first executive official and anything 
offered by the proposed deportee. In essence, the second official’s 
function is to confirm the veracity of the claims made in the Final 
Administrative Deportation Order, including verification of 
identity, and if so satisfied, to affirm the deportation. If this order is 
affirmed, then the individual is deported after fourteen (14) days, 
provided that an appeal of this decision is not lodged within that 
time frame. 
The minimal impact of domestic constitutional standards 
must be understood with the context of various international legal 
instruments that have an import in U.S. deportation matters. An 
international instrument often invoked to thwart government 
attempts at removal is the UN Convention Against Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CAT).196 As the 
title suggests, the treaty obligates signatories to not only refrain 
from the use of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of 
people but also forbids the transfer of an individual where 
substantial grounds exist to believe the person would be in danger 
of torture in the country of destination. 
While the proscription against removal appears to be strong, 
CAT, Article 3, does not expressly prohibit persons from being 
                                                
194 8 U.S.C. § 1225. 
195 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (b). 
196 CAT, Art. 3. 
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removed to countries where they would face cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment not rising to the level of torture.197 Thus, in the 
wake of CAT, a nation, in order to deport someone to a third 
country, must make a determination that includes taking into 
account ‘all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the 
existence in the state concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, 
flagrant, or mass violations of human rights’.198 The Presidential 
message accompanying this Convention to Congress included an 
instruction that authorities charged with making such 
determinations must decide whether and to what extent these 
considerations are relevant in a particular case.199 Similar to other 
removal provisions, the responsible international monitoring body 
has interpreted the burden of proof to be on an applicant for non-
removal.200 
The CAT covers acts of torture committed by or at the 
acquiescence of a public official.201 The threshold standard would 
be that an expulsion is prohibited where it is deemed more likely 
than not that torture would ensue.202 All the evidence required, at a 
minimum threshold, is ‘credible testimony’203 of torture. But this 
evidence must not be of a general nature. The BIA, as the Appellate 
administrative body within EOIR, has held that the evidence 
concerning likelihood of torture must be particularised to the 
individual proposed for removal. Evidence of other, similarly 
situated individuals is insufficient. In sum, the victim of torture 
must be the applicant, and he or she must furnish evidence of a 
pattern of gross human rights violations within the community 
together with any other relevant information. In domestic law, the 
                                                
197 Michael John Garcia, The U.N. Convention Against Torture: Overview of 
U.S. Implementation Policy  Concerning the Removal of Aliens, in BORDER 
SECURITY AND THE REMOVAL OF ILLEGAL ALIENS 1(Taylor Lindall ed., 2011). 
198 Id. at 5, citing CAT Art. 3(2)). 
199 Id. (citing Presidential message to congress transmitting the convention 
against torture etc. (reprinted in 13857 U.S. Con. Serial Set at 3(1990))). 
200 Id. (citing Art 22, General Comment 1, at¶ 5). 
201 Id. at 7 (citing Senate Resolution 101-30 (1990)). 
202 Id. at 9. 
203 8 C.F.R. § 208 16(c)(2) (2000). 
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Foreign Affairs Reform and Restoration Act of 1998, (FARRA) 
states unambiguously that the policy of the U.S. is to not expel, 
extradite or involuntarily remove a person to a country where there 
are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in 
danger of torture.204 Notwithstanding this prohibition, the 
government can still deport if under Immigration and Nationality 
Act where the individual has been convicted of a particularly 
serious crime and is, as such, a danger to the community in the 
U.S.205 
Individuals often invoke Article 3 of CAT to appeal under 
FARRA after a final order of alien removal under section 242 INA 
section 2242(d) but have not had much success.206 In 2007, there 
were 28,130 claims made under CAT; only 541 succeeded.207 In 
four years following CAT implementation, 1,700 aliens were 
granted deferral. The appeals that have been made, however, have 
resulted in some guidance on what conditions must be present in 
order to establish one’s burden of proof. For instance, the Sixth 
Circuit suggested that long stays in substandard prisons are not 
considered ‘torture’ within the meaning of CAT but, rapes, 
domestic violence permitted by local law enforcement and 
intentional cigarette burns by police might be considered torture.208 
Other than these few opportunities to avail themselves to 
international legal documents there are limited opportunities for 
individuals to have a removal order quashed or cancelled on 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds. Setting aside those 
individuals applying as refugees or for asylum,209 there are two 
                                                
204 Id. 
205 Immigration and Nationality Act s. 241(b)(3)(B) 
206 Id. at 11. 
207 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 
YEARBOOK (2007). 
208 Ali v. Reno, 237 F.3d 591, 598 (2001). 
209 There is a procedure for the consideration of additional humanitarian factors 
in asylum procedures. Where an individual has established past persecution and a 
well-founded fear of future persecution if returned they are returned to their home 
state, DHS has the opportunity to rebut this presumption. DHS may rebut the 
presumption by demonstrating that circumstances in the home country have 
changed so that the applicant would no longer be at risk of persecution. If DHS 
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primary ways of avoiding deportation once the deportation process 
is complete and an adverse determination has been made: the 
                                                
successfully rebut the presumption of future persecution, the burden reverts back 
to the applicant to demonstrate eligibility for a humanitarian grant of asylum 
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(ii)(A) or (B). The BIA and courts of appeals 
have often stressed that an applicant must still demonstrate past persecution in 
order to be eligible for humanitarian asylum.  Mambwe v. Holder, 572 F.3d 540, 
549 (8th Cir. 2009), Ben Hamida v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 734, 741 (6th Cir. 2007), 
Matter of L-S-, 25 I&N Dec. 705, 710 (BIA 2012). The individual than has the 
opportunity to show that he/she has compelling reasons to be fearful and 
unwilling to return to the home country because of past persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 
1208.13(b)(1)(ii)(A). Individual may be eligible for humanitarian asylum on 
these grounds when they have suffered “an atrocious form of persecution that 
results in continuing physical pain and discomfort.” Matter of L-S-, at 712. Put 
another way, the applicant must establish that the “past persecution was so severe 
that repatriation would be inhumane.” Abrha v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 1072, 1076 
(8th Cir. 2006). The focus of the inquiry is on the degree of harm suffered, the 
length of time over which the harm was inflicted, and the lingering physical 
and/or psychological effects of the harm. Id. Alternatively, the applicant may 
qualify based on a reasonable probability of other serious harm upon removal to 
the country of origin. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(ii)(B). The serious harm need not 
be inflicted on account of a Convention on the Status of Refugees ground, or 
even in connection with the past persecution, but it must be so serious that it 
equals the severity of persecution. Determinations of when other serious harm 
rises to this level are best made on a case-by-case basis. In its most recent 
decision on humanitarian asylum the BIA provided a litany of examples of 
situations that might reach that level. In one case involving an LGBT applicant 
the Ninth Circuit held that internal relocation was not available to a gay HIV+ 
Mexican man who would face “unemployment, a lack of health insurance, and 
the unavailability of necessary medications in Mexico to treat his disease,” 
because he would likely experience other serious harm. Id. (citing Boer-Sedano 
v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1082, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2005)). Other examples of serious 
harm could include: extreme circumstances of inadequate health care, Pllumi v. 
Att’y Gen. of U.S., 642 F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 2011); mental anguish of a mother 
who was a victim of FGM having to choose between abandoning her child or 
seeing the child suffer the same fate, Kone v. Holder, 596 F.3d 141, 152-53 (2d 
Cir. 2010); or unavailability of psychiatric medication necessary for the applicant 
to function, Kholyavskiy v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 555, 577 (7th Cir. 2008). Asylum 
Basics: Elements of Asylum Law, 3.5 Humanitarian Asylum, IMMIGRATION 
EQUALITY, http://immigrationequality.org/issues/law-library/lgbth-asylum-
manual/asylum-basics-elements-asylum-law/. 
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prospective deportee can seek a cancellation or suspension of the 
order to deport. Essentially, these procedures embody consideration 
of the ‘humanitarian’ principles discussed above. These steps can 
be thought of as pleas for leniency after a decision has been handed 
down. The deportation determinations process is quite mechanistic 
or ministerial in its preoccupation with merely establishing the 
grounds for removal, matching them with applicable statutory 
standards on such grounds and providing a second set of eyes to 
verify the veracity of the grounds for removal, including verifying 
the identity of the proffered deportee. Only after the decision to 
remove has been reached, will the court consider the possibility of 
cancelling the order of removal. 
V.  ANALYSIS 
Under U.S. law, once one is subject to a removal order, he 
or she can apply for a cancellation of the order.210 Cancellation is 
the functional equivalent of establishing humanitarian grounds for 
remaining in either Canada or New Zealand following an order of 
removal. Importantly, those deported under the expedited process 
are not eligible to apply for cancellation of the removal.211 Both 
permanent and temporary residents may apply for cancellation, 
though the requirements for temporary residents are more onerous. 
In essence, the Attorney General “may” cancel removal when 
certain prerequisites are met —- such as length of residence in the 
U.S.;212 is of good moral character;213 has not been convicted of 
certain offenses not included within the ‘aggravated felonies’ 
category;214 and the potential deportee establishes that removal 
would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the 
alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the U.S. or an 
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”215 Special 
                                                
210 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (a). 
211 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (a)(3). 
212 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (b)(1)(A). 
213 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (b)(1)(B). 
214 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (b)(1)(C). 
215 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (b)(1)(D). 
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provision is also made for cancellation of removal orders for 
victims of domestic violence within this section.216 In essence, the 
mechanism of cancellation serves as a final review mechanism in 
which evidence concerning mitigating humanitarian considerations 
can be taken into account as a final step in the process. While the 
law makes no specific provision for the presentation of international 
obligations in this section and indeed contains no requirement that 
the reviewing authority consider them, there is no bar to their 
inclusion at this stage. Certainly, given the fact of the order of 
removal the only question remaining is whether these other factors 
should militate against the execution of the removal. Cancellation 
will return the person to status of an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence still subject to all of the laws pertaining to 
prospective residents. Moreover, while ostensibly a vehicle for 
humanitarian concerns to thwart removal, the law limits the number 
of cancellations that Attorney General may grant to 4,000 per 
year.217 
The above discussion shows significant commonalities 
across the removal process and humanitarian and compassionate 
appeals in these three countries. The U.S. immigration law 
maintains ostensibly humanitarian factors in its administration of 
immigration decisions through the cancellations process. New 
Zealand immigration officials are permitted to consider such factors 
along with international obligations when determining whether or 
not to issue deportation orders. Canadian courts have determined a 
six-factor test to determining a humanitarian and compassionate 
appeal of deportation. In each case, the ‘alien’ is deemed to have 
lesser substantive rights than citizens. Judicial review in all three 
cases is limited to verifying that only minimal aspects of natural 
justice rights have been met during the respective administrative 
processes. New Zealand’s process seems to require the least in 
terms of even these minimum requirements by not requiring a 
record be kept by the immigration officer as to the considerations of 
international humanitarian authority, if any, considered in the 
                                                
216 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b (2), (5). 
217 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (e). 
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decision-making process. Furthermore, all three countries share 
public safety, national security or foreign policy interests as factors 
of consideration in such proceedings. 
This similarity of law is reflected by shared interests in the 
underlying immigration national policies. In the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries’ immigration policy in all three states had 
similar racialist ethos and economic development considerations. 
Later they encouraged open immigration system designed to fuel 
economic growth but retained a strong racialist or native bias 
against various classes of immigrants.218 The post-War, post-
colonialist world saw all states move away from explicit racial or 
ethnic categories to an immigration system founded on national 
economic development, family unification and protection of 
refugees and other person who have been subject to discrimination, 
persecution or other humanitarian and political tragedies.  Despite 
their different constitutional bases the courts and the legislation of 
each state when considering immigration issues have taken 
constitution principles, rules and values, which include concern of 
governmental power and individual rights and dignity (both natural, 
positive and common law), have been imported in the public 
administrative law to create unique areas of the law.  Thus 
paradoxically due process considerations are embedded within 
plenary power. 
Against this common policy and legal background, all the 
states have retained, without significant judicial review or 
constitutional scrutiny, the right to remove undesirable non-citizens. 
While the amount of removals as a percentage of the total 
immigrant populations remains small, they have been averaging 
between one  percent and three  percent (1%-3%) per annum in the 
U.S., the overall trend since the late 1990’s has been moving 
towards increasing removals.219 This increase of removals has been 
enabled by a narrowing of the class of individuals ineligible for 
permanent residency and who may not appeal their exclusion or 
removal. Moreover, process changes such as “fast-track” 
                                                
218 MOLONEY, supra note 6, at 25. 
219 MOLONEY, supra note 6. 
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procedures to expedite removal together with an expansion of 
executive discretion and the lessening of judicial scrutiny of factual 
and legal determinations of humanitarian and compassionate 
appeals have combined to create significant burdens to avoid 
removal. 
Why these various states have all streamlined their removal 
procedures and limited appeals from each individual state is an 
issue beyond the scope of this paper. Various factors, from the 
securitization of immigration issue with the rise of fundamentalism 
in the post-cold war world, to economic uncertainty, xenophobia 
and nativist sentiment, the perceived failure of assimilative and 
multicultural policies have been noted. Whatever the cause, it is 
evident that the sovereign prerogative as embodied by executive or 
ministerial authority continues to dominate and is becoming 
increasingly dominant in this area of the law. The narrowing of 
humanitarian and compassionate appeals are bound up in this 
process. Yet it is clear the humanitarian and compassionate factors 
can be important considerations for cancelling or quashing removal 
or exclusion decisions in each state. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
It is evident with the consideration of the three jurisdictions 
that humanitarian and compassionate appeals have become more 
difficult to make and win. Legislation in all three states have 
precluded certain classes of individuals from making an appeal and 
the facts relating to personal hardship which may be placed before 
the appropriate authority have been circumscribed and conditioned. 
Constitutional and international legal obligations which may be 
appropriate and in other instances are incorporated into domestic 
law are often read down, overlooked or ignored. First, the classes of 
individuals excluded individuals who may not apply for these 
appeals have been expanded – particularly in those categories 
related to terrorism and serious crime. These expanded classes 
reflect an increased national security orientation found in 
immigration law and policy. This security orientation has 
accompanied a renewed paradoxical notion of national identity and 
exclusive citizenship based on that national identity and universal 
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rights.  Second, the equitable factors upon which these appeals are 
based have been narrowed. In all these states, the international 
factors set out in instruments such as CAT which in themselves 
could be used to support a “humanitarian and compassionate” 
appeal are excluded from consideration or may be re-considered by 
the courts if denied by the executive. These developments narrow 
the broad range of family, social, emotional, medical, economic, 
cultural factors and circumstances which may be relevant to these 
types of appeals. Third, the range of executive discretion has 
increased and has accompanied the lessening traction of 
administrative, due process and constitutional review by the courts. 
The governments in each state have narrowed or qualified the 
factors to be reviewed (such as the seven-prong test in New 
Zealand) and opened the process up to a wide relatively standard-
less discretion (e.g. “voluntary departures” in the U.S.). This 
process has been accomplished by legislative and executive 
innovation acquiesced to by the courts under separation of power 
and administrative law principles. As such, there is an illusion of 
wide ranging consideration. It appears that the decision maker may 
consider any relevant factors but it cannot be determined whether 
any prohibited or material factors are included in the decision. A 
problem compounded by the use of various administrative 
procedures, which prevent the development of a requisite record to 
enable the court to review a decision. 
 
